Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony by Emons, Winand & Fluet, Claude
      
Emons: Departement Volkswirtschaftslehre, Universität Bern, Schanzeneckstrasse l, Postfach 8573, CH-3001 Bern, 
Switzerland 
Phone: +41-31-6313922; Fax: +41-31-6313383 
winand.emons@vwi.unibe.ch 
Fluet: Université du Québec à Montréal and CIRPÉE, C.P. 8888, Succ. Centre-Ville, Montréal, Canada H3C 3P8 
Phone: +1-514-9878386; Fax : +1-514-9878494 
fluet.claude-denys@uqam.ca 
 
We thank Tilman Börgers, Bob Cooter, Eddie Dekel, Sambuddha Ghosh, Navin Kartik, Simon Lörtscher, and 
Jennifer Reinganum for helpful comments. Emons acknowledges the hospitality of the Department of Economics at 
Boston University. The usual disclaimer applies. 
 
 
 
 
Cahier de recherche/Working Paper 11-22 
 
 
 
Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony 
 
 
Winand Emons 
Claude Fluet 
 
 
 
 
Août/August 2011 
 
Abstract:  
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict 
may present further evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a 
cost. At equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in 
favor of one party, this party testifies. When the evidence is close to the prior mean, no 
party testifies. We compare this outcome under a purely adversarial procedure with the 
outcome under a purely inquisitorial procedure where it is for the arbiter to decide how 
much testimony he wants to hear. 
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1 Introduction
How much testimony will an arbiter hear in adversarial proceedings when
the parties to the conflict may spend resources to misrepresent evidence in
their favor? Will both parties come forward with boosted claims offsetting
each other, or will only the party for whom the evidence is favorable testify?
Are there circumstances where no party testifies? What are the efficiency
properties of the outcome? Is the adversarial procedure where the parties to
the conflict decide whether or not they testify better than the inquisitorial
procedure where the arbiter decides how much testimony he wants to hear?
In this paper we address these questions.
An arbiter has to decide on an issue which we take to be a real number,
for example, the damages that one party owes to the other. The defendant
wants the damages awarded to be small whereas the plaintiff wants them
to be large. Both parties know the actual amount owed to the plaintiff and
both would like to influence the arbiter’s decision.
As a benchmark we first look at a pure disclosure framework. Parties can
only submit hard information, thereby disclosing the true value. Presenting
evidence involves a fixed cost. Alternatively, the parties may remain silent.
In a purely adversarial procedure the parties decide whether or not to
present testimony. The arbiter is passive at the discovery stage. Once the
parties have finished, he decides the case on the basis of his priors and of
what can be inferred from the parties’ actions. The arbiter seeks to min-
imize adjudication error, implying that his sequentially rational decision is
to adjudicate the posterior mean. When he hears no testimony, given the
symmetry of the parties’ actions, the posterior mean equals the prior, which
the arbiter therefore adjudicates. When he hears testimony, he knows and
adjudicates the true value.
The pure disclosure game has a unique equilibrium. The defendant tes-
tifies for low values of damages, the plaintiff for high values, and for values
in between both parties remain silent. We measure welfare by summing the
social loss from inaccurate adjudication and the parties’ submission costs.
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The equilibrium has the following virtues. When actual damages are close to
the prior mean so that the informational value is small, the parties remain
silent. There are no submission costs, yet some inaccuracy. Only when the
informational value is high, do the parties come forward and testify.
Under a purely inquisitorial procedure the arbiter decides how much tes-
timony he wants to hear. He announces whether he wants to hear no, one,
or both parties. When he hears no testimony, submission costs are zero and
the arbiter adjudicates the mean leading to a loss from inaccurate decisions.
In the pure disclosure setup the arbiter will never ask both parties to testify:
one testimony reveals the truth. If the arbiter asks a party to testify, he
adjudicates the true value, yet at the expense of the submission cost. Un-
der the inquisitorial procedure there is no fine-tuning as to the realization of
damages. But the arbiter has full control over which kind of costs he incurs.
Under the adversarial procedure the arbiter always expects both silence
and testimony. Under the inquisitorial procedure he fully controls the amount
of testimony. When he cares little about accurate decisions, he refuses to hear
the parties; when he cares a lot, he asks a party to testify. Therefore, the
inquisitorial procedure does better than the adversarial one when the arbiter
cares little or a lot about accurate decisions. The adversarial procedure, by
contrast, does better when the arbiter cares about both accurate decisions
and submission costs.
Next we allow parties to inflate testimony. The parties can boost the
evidence in either direction, but distorting the evidence involves additional
costs: the greater the distortion, the higher the cost. For instance, expert
witnesses charge more the more they distort the truth. We now have a two-
sender signalling game.
The equilibrium under the adversarial procedure is similar to the pure
disclosure equilibrium. No party testifies when the true value is close to
the prior mean and thus influencing the arbiter has negligible private value.
When, however, the evidence is sufficiently in favor of one party, this party
comes forward and testifies.
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But now parties inflate their testimony. If the plaintiff testifies, he over-
states the true value; if the defendant testifies, he understates the true value.
Boasting increases the more the true amount differs from the prior mean,
yet at a decreasing rate. Accordingly, for sufficiently large deviations from
the prior mean the equilibrium is revealing, but it involves falsification on
the part of the party who testifies. The arbiter rationally corrects for the
exaggerated amount and adjudicates the true value. Stated differently, be-
cause the marginal cost of slightly distorting the truth is negligible but the
marginal return is not, the arbiter expects some falsification, leading parties
to do so systematically. The equilibrium involves both falsification costs and
error costs.
Under the inquisitorial procedure when the arbiter decides to hear one
party, depending on who testifies, the party over- resp. understates the true
value. The arbiter rationally corrects for the exaggerated amount and ad-
judicates the true value. Accordingly, the equilibrium is revealing but it
involves falsification. When both parties submit, both testimonies involve
falsification: one party over-reports while the other under-reports. The ar-
biter corrects for this by taking an average of the exaggerated testimonies.
Interestingly, under joint testimony a party inflates less than if he is the only
one to testify. Under joint testimony the arbiter attaches less weight to his
claims than under single testimony. Total falsification costs are lower than
under single testimony, but fixed submission costs are duplicated. Yet, if
fixed submission costs are low, joint testimony is cheaper than single testi-
mony.
The welfare comparison yields the following results. When wasteful in-
fluence expenditures are not too large, the inquisitorial procedure performs
better when the arbiter has strong views about error costs; otherwise the
adversarial procedure does better. This result resembles our pure disclosure
result. Nevertheless, when falsification expenditures are large and fixed sub-
mission costs low, the inquisitorial procedure does better irrespective of the
weight attached to accurate decisions: the inquisitorial arbiter requires joint
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submission leading to lower falsification expenditures than the adversarial
procedure.
It is standard in the literature to view accuracy in adjudication and pro-
cedural economy as the objectives at which legal procedures should aim. Ad-
versarial systems of discovery clearly motivate parties to provide evidence.
Nevertheless, they are often criticized (e.g., Tullock 1975, 1980) for yielding
excessive expenditures through unnecessary duplication and costly overpro-
duction of misleading information.
We refer to legal procedures for concreteness. However, the same issues
arise in regulatory or administrative hearings as well as in many other con-
texts. For example, Milgrom (1988) argues that those best informed of the
consequences of alternative decisions are also often the ones most affected
by them. Therefore, organizations face a trade-off between eliciting useful
information and limiting the wasteful “influence activities”, geared at purely
redistributive aims, of those who inform decision-makers.
We tackle the cost/accuracy trade-off as a signalling game on the basis
of the so-called “costly state falsification” approach with costly testimonies
as signals.1 Testimony by one party results in a one-sender signalling game
with a continuum of types where a type is given by the true state of the
world. Testimony of both parties yields a two-sender game with perfectly
correlated types. Since signals are non-stochastic, the true sate is inferred in
both procedures.
Kartik et al. (2007) and Kartik (2009) consider a single sender who
can send inflated messages. Boosting is costly. In the second paper the
sender’s type space is bounded. The sender communicates with a single
receiver. In the first paper the sender’s type space is unbounded and he
communicates with one or more receivers. In both papers the sender has to
1The costly state falsification approach has been used in a principal-agent context. See
Lacker and Weinberg (1989), Maggi and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1995), and Crocker and Morgan
(1998). For example, the latter paper analyzes the falsification of insurance claims. The
agent is privately informed about the true value of the loss and is able to misrepresent
this quantity at a cost.
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send a message; he cannot be silent. The setup is thus reminiscent of the
inquisitorial procedure when one party has to testify.
One strand of the litigation literature has viewed the trial outcome as an
exogenous function of the litigants’ levels of effort or expenditure by using so-
called success contest functions; see Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989), Farmer and
Pecorino (1999), Katz (1988), and Parisi (2002). In these papers adjudication
is a zero-one variable, i.e., a party either wins or loses. Parties engage in a
rent-seeking game, leading to excessive expenditures. Our approach differs
in that the arbiter’s decisions are part of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In
our set-up the arbiter is a sophisticated decision-maker who understands the
parties’ incentives to boost their claims.
In another strand of literature, trials are modeled as persuasion games.
Parties cannot falsify the evidence as such, but are able to misrepresent it
by disclosing only what they see fit; see Sobel (1985), Milgrom and Roberts
(1986), Lewis and Poitevin (1997), and Shin (1998). A variant of this litera-
ture includes models where the parties engage in strategic sequential search
of favorable evidence; see Froeb and Kobayashi (1996) and Daughety and
Reinganum (2000). In our main framework, by contrast, the parties do not
have access to hard information; they dissipate resources in attempting to
fabricate convincing stories. However, as benchmark, we will also discuss the
case of hard information in order to compare with our signalling model.
Our paper is most closely related to the economics literature comparing
adversarial with inquisitorial procedures of truth-finding. In this literature,
“inquisitorial” usually refers to a system where a neutral investigator searches
for evidence, “adversarial” to one where the parties to the conflict control
the uncovering and presentation of evidence; see Shin (1998), Dewatripont
and Tirole (1999), Froeb and Kobayashi (2001), and Palumbo (2001). How-
ever, in civil litigation and by contrast with criminal trials, the presentation
of evidence essentially rests with the parties even in so-called inquisitorial
systems. The main difference is the judge’s involvement in controlling the
litigants’ presentation of evidence through bench requests, questions, and the
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like; see Jolowicz (2000), Langbein (1985), or Parisi (2002) for a comparative
description, along these lines, of adversarial and inquisitorial systems. De-
mougin and Fluet (2008) present an analysis of active versus passive judging
in a persuasion game set-up. They show that a more active or inquisitorial
arbiter may eliminate inefficient equilibria. However, they doe not deal with
influence costs as such nor with the trade-off between submission costs and
accuracy.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe a
simplified set-up where the parties cannot falsify. In section 3 we extend
the framework to inflated testimonies. Section 4 concludes. Most proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 Pure Disclosure
A plaintiff P has sued a defendant D. The issue to be settled is the amount of
damages x ∈ R. The plaintiff wants damages to be large while the defendant
wants them to be small.2 The evidence available so far about x is given by the
normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2. We denote the density by
f(x) and the cumulative by F (x).3 At the beginning of the trial all parties
involved, i.e., plaintiff, defendant, and arbiter, know the distribution of x.
The mean is such that, given the expected outcome at trial, the plaintiff’s
claim has positive net value.4
Once the trial has started, both plaintiff and defendant learn the real-
ization of x. The fact that they have become perfectly informed is common
2We take x to be damages. Yet other examples abound. In a divorce case x may be the
amount of support P should get from D; in regulatory hearings x may the rental charge
for a local loop, the incumbent wants the charge to be high whereas the entrant wants
it to be low; a CEO has to decide on a transfer price, the downstream unit wants it to
be low, the upstream unit wants it to be high. More generally, parties with conflicting
interests face an arbiter who will deliver a decision.
3Support over the whole line is assumed in order to avoid boundary conditions. The
probability of extreme values of x can be made, however, arbitrarily small.
4We make this precise at the end of this section.
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knowledge. The trial cannot be stopped at this point; the adjudicator has
to decide the case. In particular, we rule out any out-of-court settlement
negotiations. The arbiter can adjudicate solely on the basis of his priors at
that stage of the procedure as given by f(x). Alternatively, he may receive
further evidence submitted from the perfectly informed but self-interested
plaintiff and defendant.
After plaintiff and defendant have become informed, they may testify.
Testimony is costly. A submission is of the form “the value of the quantity
at issue is xi”, i = P,D. In the pure disclosure setup the parties can only
submit hard information, thereby disclosing the true value, i.e., claims are
restricted to xi = x. Alternatively, the parties may refrain from testifying,
which is denoted by ∅i, i = P,D. A party’s action is therefore si ∈ {∅, x}.
The cost is
ci(si, x) =
{
γ, if si = x;
0, if si = ∅,
i = P,D where γ > 0. The total cost of testimony is C = cP + cD. The ar-
biter observes the defendant’s and the plaintiff’s actions and then adjudicates
xˆ(sP , sD) ∈ R.
Society is concerned about the loss from inaccuracy in adjudication and
the cost of testimony. Accordingly, there is a potential trade-off between
procedural costs and the social benefits of correct adjudication. The total
social loss is
L = l + C
where l is the societal loss from inaccurate adjudication or “error costs”. Let
xˆ be the arbiter’s decision. The loss from inaccurate adjudication is
l(xˆ, x) = θ(xˆ− x)2
where θ > 0 is the rate at which society trades off accuracy against submis-
sion costs. If the true value is adjudicated, error costs are zero. The more
the decision errs in either direction, the higher the losses from inaccurate
adjudication and such losses increase at an increasing rate the further one
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moves away from the truth.5
2.1 Adversarial procedure
Under a purely adversarial procedure, it is for the parties to decide whether
they testify or not.6 The procedure is as follows. The parties observe x
and then simultaneously choose sP and sD. The arbiter observes the parties’
actions and then adjudicates xˆ. The arbiter is a perfect agent and adjudicates
so as to minimize expected error costs.
The parties choose sP and sD so as to maximize piP and piD where
piP (xˆ, sP , x) = xˆ− cP (sP , x) and
piD(xˆ, sD, x) = − xˆ− cD(sD, x).
After the arbiter has observed the agents’ choices, he updates his beliefs;
these are given by the probability distribution over x in the information set
given by the parties’ actions.
The pure disclosure game has a straightforward unique equilibrium. The
defendant testifies for low values of x, the plaintiff for high values, and for
values in between both parties remain silent.
Proposition 1: In the unique equilibrium of the adversarial procedure the
plaintiff discloses when x ≥ µ + γ and is silent otherwise. The defendant
discloses when x ≤ µ− γ and is silent otherwise. The judge adjudicates the
true x when he hears testimony; otherwise, he adjudicates xˆ = µ.
Proof: Given the judge’s concern about correct decisions, he adjudicates
xˆ = x when he hears testimony. When he hears no testimony suppose he
5Society wants correct judicial decisions so that legal rules provide the intended incen-
tives; the regulator and the CEO want correct prices to avoid misallocations of resources.
6According to Jolowicz (2000, p. 28) under the adversary system “it is for the parties
to determine not only the issues which the court is to decide, but also the material on
which the decision will be based. The evidence presented to the court will be that which
the parties choose to present and none other. The judge may not require that a particular
witness be summoned to give evidence or that a particular document be produced; he may
not even question the witnesses himself except for the purpose of clarifying some doubt as
to the meaning of what a witness has said under examination by counsel.”
9
adjudicates some xˆ = ν. Given the judge’s behavior, the parties will never
testify together. If, say, the defendant deviates to no testimony while the
plaintiff testifies, the defendant doesn’t change the arbiter’s decision and
saves the submission cost γ.
Suppose the defendant is silent. The plaintiff will disclose if x − γ ≥ ν;
otherwise, he is better off remaining silent. Likewise, the defendant will
disclose if −x − γ ≥ − ν and is silent otherwise given the plaintiff is silent.
Therefore, the arbiter knows that x ∈ (ν − γ, ν + γ) when he hears no
testimony. To minimize error he adjudicates the posterior mean. Given that
f(x) is normal, ν = E(x|ν − γ < x < ν + γ) is possible only if ν = µ. 
The social loss is the sum of the error cost over the interval where the
parties remain silent and the submission cost over the range of x where the
parties testify. At equilibrium
LA(θ, γ) = θ
∫ µ+γ
µ−γ
(x− µ)2f(x) dx+ [F (µ− γ) + 1− F (µ+ γ)]γ, (1)
where the superscript A stands for the adversarial procedure.
We express the social loss as a function of the submission cost γ and the
weight θ given to the error cost because we will perform our welfare analysis in
this space. We immediately obtain limγ→0 LA(θ, γ) := LA(θ, 0) = 0. A reduc-
tion in γ not only reduces the cost of testimony but also the interval where
parties are silent, thus also error costs. We also have limγ→∞ LA(θ, γ) :=
LA(θ,∞) = θσ2. For very high γ it becomes extremely unlikely to hear
testimony at all.7
2.2 Inquisitorial procedure
Let us now turn to a purely inquisitorial procedure. Under this procedure
the arbiter decides how much testimony he wants to hear.8 He does so as
7F (µ− γ) and 1−F (µ+ γ) decrease exponentially fast when γ goes to infinity. Hence,
the second term in (1) goes to zero.
8According to Jolowicz (2000, p. 220) under the inquisitorial system “it is for the
judge to examine the witnesses, if any, it is for the judge to decide whether to summon
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to minimize the total social loss L = l + C. Specifically, the arbiter first
announces whether he wants to hear no, one, or both parties. Afterwards
the arbiter adjudicates.
When the arbiter refuses testimony, submission costs are zero. The arbiter
then minimizes expected error costs solely on the basis of the priors implying
xˆ = µ. The expected total loss is then LI = θσ2 where the superscript I
indicates the inquisitorial procedure. In the pure disclosure set-up the arbiter
will never ask both parties to testify. One testimony reveals the truth and a
second testimony only adds to submission costs. Therefore, the inquisitorial
judge will order at most one party to talk, leading to the loss LI = γ. The
arbiter chooses the action leading to the smallest social loss, thus
LI(θ, γ) = min(γ, θσ2). (2)
2.3 Welfare comparison
From a welfare point of view the adversarial procedure has the following
virtues. When the social value of information is small (i.e., x is close to
the prior µ), the private benefit of testifying is also small; the parties then
remain silent and do not spend resources on testifying, yet at the expense
of some inaccuracy in adjudication. When the social value of information is
large, the private benefit of disclosing is also large; the parties then testify
thus enabling correct decisions, yet at the expense of the cost of disclosing.
Nevertheless, the parties’ incentives to testify need not be perfectly aligned
with the social value of information. By contrast, the inquisitorial procedure
is all-or-nothing: ex ante it either enforces or forbids testimony; there is no
fine-tuning.
Comparing (1) and (2), it is obvious that the inquisitorial procedure does
better when θ is either sufficiently small or sufficiently large. We have the
following result.
the parties for interrogation and it is the judge who acts to obtain the assistance of an
expert when required.”
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Proposition 2: For all γ > 0, there exists 0 < θ(γ) < θ(γ) such that
LA < LI if θ ∈ (θ(γ), θ(γ)) and LI ≤ LA otherwise.
Figure 1 depicts the social loss under each procedure as a function of θ.
Under the inquisitorial procedure, the loss is the ex ante value of information,
θσ2, so long as this is smaller than the disclosure cost. Under the adversarial
procedure, the loss is a straight line with slope less than σ2 and vertical
intercept less than the disclosure cost. In the Appendix we show that the
LA and LI lines always intersect. Thus, for any positive disclosure cost,
which procedure is better depends on the importance given to accuracy in
adjudication. When the arbiter does not care too much about error costs or
conversely when he cares a lot, he does better with the inquisitorial procedure
where he fully controls which kind of costs he incurs. When the value of
accuracy is in some intermediate range, the adversarial procedure does better.
2L

  ,IL
  ,AL
L

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  )(12 F
Figure 1: Inquisitorial versus adversarial
Our next result provides a characterization in (θ, γ)-space. To provide
intuition, we first compare the adversarial procedure with a first-best sce-
nario. Suppose a social planner observes x together with the parties. The
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planner cannot adjudicate, which is the arbiter’s responsibility, but he can
force or forbid disclosure. When there is disclosure, the arbiter adjudicates
xˆ = x; when there is no disclosure, he will rationally adjudicate xˆ = µ. Ob-
viously, the planner forces at most one party to disclose. He does so when
the informational value is worth the cost, i.e., when θ(x − µ)2 ≥ γ. He will
thus forbid disclosure when x ∈ (µ −√γ/θ, µ +√γ/θ) and he will enforce
disclosure otherwise.
Therefore, when γ =
√
γ/θ or equivalently γ = 1/θ, the parties’ decisions
under the adversarial procedure are socially efficient. When γ > 1/θ, the
plaintiff and defendant inefficiently remain silent for some values of x. When
γ < 1/θ, there is inefficient disclosure for some values.9 Generically the
amount of testimony is inefficient but is sometimes very close to the first
best. Under the inquisitorial procedure, there is also either too much or too
little testifying compared to the first best, but the outcome is then all or
nothing.
Corollary 1: If θ ≤ θ(γ), then γ ∈ (θσ2, 1/θ); if θ ≥ θ(γ), then γ ∈
(1/θ, θσ2).
The result is illustrated in Figure 2. The lines γ = 1/θ and γ = θσ2
partition the (θ, γ)-space into four regions. Together with Proposition 1, the
Corollary tells us that the inquisitorial procedure does better than the ad-
versarial one only in the interior of regions 2 and 4. Along the line γ = 1/θ
the adversarial outcome yields the first-best. In region 1 there is too little
disclosure under the adversarial procedure. However, there is no disclosure
at all under the inquisitorial one, so that adversarial does better than in-
quisitorial. In region 3 we have too much disclosure under the adversarial
procedure; yet there is even more disclosure under the inquisitorial one so
that again adversarial does better than inquisitorial.
In region 2 there is too little disclosure under the adversarial proce-
dure while disclosure always occurs under the inquisitorial procedure. From
9Inefficient non-disclosure arises for x in (µ +
√
γ/θ, µ + γ) or (µ − γ, µ − √γ/θ);
inefficient disclosure for x in (µ+ γ, µ+
√
γ/θ) or (µ−√γ/θ, µ− γ).
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Proposition 1 we know that there exists an area such as I2 where the inquisi-
torial procedure does better. In region 4 there is too much disclosure under
the adversarial procedure and no disclosure at all under the inquisitorial one.
From Proposition 1 again, there is an area such as I4 where the inquisitorial
procedure yields a smaller social cost. In the Appendix we show that the ar-
eas are as represented in the Figure. In particular, the boundary of region I2
gets asymptotically close to γ = 1/θ or γ = θσ2 when γ becomes arbitrarily
small or large.
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Figure 2: Optimal procedures under pure disclosure
To sum up: The inquisitorial procedure does better when either (i) it
forbids testimony, there is too much disclosure under the adversarial regime,
and the arbiter does not care too much about correct decisions, or (ii) when it
enforces testimony, there is too little disclosure under the adversarial system,
and the arbiter cares a lot about correct decisions. Otherwise the adversarial
procedure does a better job than the inquisitorial one.
Let us finally look at the plaintiff’s decision to sue. Under the adversarial
procedure, the plaintiff’s expected payoff at equilibrium is µ− γ(1− F (µ +
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γ)). Under the inquisitorial procedure, his expected payoff is µ − γ if he
thinks he will be required to testify; otherwise it is µ. The plaintiff sues if
his expected payoff is positive. Under either procedure, µ > γ is clearly a
sufficient condition.
3 Inflated Testimony
Let us now extend our pure disclosure model to a set-up where the parties
can falsify the evidence at a cost. Again a submission is of the form “the
value of the quantity at issue is xi”, i = P,D. Now it should be thought of
as a story or argument rendering xi plausible, together with the supporting
documents, witnesses, etc. The cost of a presentation is γ+κ (xi − x)2 where
κ > 0. The actual value is x, which is observed by the party, and xi is the
testimony or the statement submitted.
A distorting testimony is more costly than simply reporting the naked
truth as it involves more fabrication. We take a quadratic function to cap-
ture the idea that the cost of misrepresenting the evidence increases at an
increasing rate the further one moves away from the truth: it becomes more
difficult to produce the corresponding documents or experts charge more the
more they distort the truth. Falsification costs increase with the parameter
κ; for κ going to zero falsification becomes costless and for κ arbitrarily large
our pure disclosure set-up applies.10
A party’s action is now si ∈ {∅ ∪ R} with cost
ci(si, x) =
{
γ + κ (xi − x)2 , if si = xi ∈ R;
0, if si = ∅, (3)
i = P,D. We now have a signalling game. It differs from the usual signalling
model in that two senders share the same information.
10Maggi and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1995) use the same lying cost function and interpret
κ as capturing the publicness of information. If κ = 0, falsification is costless; therefore,
information is purely private. As κ increases, it becomes more costly to falsify information
and for an arbitrarily large κ the public-information model obtains.
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The message xi in (3) is simply a costly action. Its meaning or rather the
inference drawn from it will therefore be determined by the arbiter’s beliefs
at equilibrium. From a formal point of view, given the symmetry of the cost
function (3), it would not matter if, say, we were to model the plaintiff as
attempting to influence the arbiter’s beliefs in his favor by playing xP < x
(rather than xP > x). In this perspective, “less” would simply be interpreted
as meaning “more”. However, we will stick to the interpretation that xP has
the literal meaning “the true state is xP”. The plaintiff then tells the truth
if xP = x; he boosts his case, that is, he “lies” or “falsifies” in his favor if
xP > x. At equilibrium, of course, the arbiter may not believe a testimony’s
literal meaning and may take into account a party’s incentive to make inflated
claims.11
3.1 Adversarial procedure
In principle we can have equilibria where testimony provides some infor-
mation or we can have totally uninformative pooling equilibria. The latter
possibility is easily discarded. First, standard refinements such as Grossman-
Perry (1986) rule out equilibria where both parties would always remain
silent. Suppose on the contrary that they do and the judge rationally ad-
judicates xˆ = µ. Now take some out-of-equilibrium message xP . In the
Appendix we show the existence of an interval (x, x) such that, for x in this
interval, a plaintiff playing the action xP has a payoff strictly larger than his
equilibrium payoff if the judge were to correctly infer from xP that x ∈ (x, x)
and accordingly update his beliefs using Bayes’ rule. Secondly, it cannot be
the case that both parties always testify with claims that are invariant with
the true state.12
We focus on revealing equilibria; by revealing we mean that the arbiter
11For developments along these lines see Kartik (2009).
12Suppose that P always claims xP and D always claims xD. The judge adjudicates
xˆ = µ. If P deviates to ∅P , he adjudicates some ν. But then P ’s payoff from the deviation
is ν > µ− γ − κ(xP − x)2 when x differs sufficiently from xP . The same argument holds
if D were to always play ∅D.
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infers the true state when the parties testify. We impose the following struc-
ture.
No-understatement: At equilibrium, if P testifies at x, he claims xP ≥ x;
if D testifies at x, he claims xD ≤ x. The condition is in keeping with the
convention that testimony has literal meaning.
Monotonicity : At equilibrium, if P testifies at x, he also testifies at x′ > x
and xP (x
′) ≥ xP (x); if D testifies at x, he also testifies at x′′ < x and
xD(x
′′) ≤ xD(x).
Minimality: At an out-of-equilibrium information set the arbiter believes
that it was reached with the minimum number of deviations from the equi-
librium strategies.13
To clarify minimality, consider an out-of-equilibrium pair (sP , sD), mean-
ing there does not exist x satisfying (sP (x), sD(x)) = (sP , sD). If neither
sP nor sD is ever observed at equilibrium, minimality imposes no restriction
on beliefs. However, if sP is never observed but sD is, the arbiter assigns
unit probability to the event {x : sD(x) = sD}, i.e., he infers that P has
deviated and that D has not; we impose no restriction on how probability
is distributed over the relevant set: if, say, sD = ∅D and at equilibrium D
is silent only for x ∈ [x, x], by minimality the arbiter puts unit mass on this
interval and any distribution is admissible. The same holds if we reverse
the role of sP and sD. Finally, if both sP and sD are observed at equilib-
rium, although never simultaneously, the arbiter assigns unit probability to
the event {x : sD(x) = sD or sP (x) = sP}, i.e., he infers that one party
must have deviated but may not be sure which one. Again we impose no
restriction on the distribution over the relevant set.
In the Appendix we prove the following result:
13A similar restriction on beliefs has been used by Bagwell and Ramey (1991), Schultz
(1999) or Emons and Fluet (2009); see also Hetzendorf and Overgaard (2001) and Fluet
and Garella (2001). These papers also involve two-sender signalling games with perfectly
correlated information.
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Lemma 1: In a revealing equilibrium, (i) each party’s strategy involves both
silence and testimony; (ii) the plaintiff and the defendant never testify to-
gether.
The Lemma implies that there exists x0D < x
0
P , both finite, such that the
defendant testifies when x ≤ x0D and is otherwise silent, while the plaintiff
testifies when x ≥ x0P and is otherwise silent. The consequence is that,
for x ≥ x0P , the plaintiff’s equilibrium separating strategy xP (x) can be
derived using the well-known methods of one-sender signalling games.14 The
only difference is that the equilibrium profile (xP (x), ∅D) will need to be
supported by out-of-equilibrium beliefs preventing a deviation by D. The
same observations apply to the defendant’s separating strategy over the half-
line x ≤ x0D.
For x ≥ x0P , the arbiter’s strategy is xˆ(xP , ∅D) where xP is the plain-
tiff’s testimony. The plaintiff chooses xP to maximize xˆ(sP , ∅D)− cP (xP , x).
If xP (x) is separating, the function is one-to-one and the arbiter therefore
adjudicates xˆ(sP , ∅D) = x−1P (xP ). Because the strategy is optimal for the
plaintiff, he chooses xP to maximize x
−1
P (xP )− cP (xP , x). Substituting from
(3), the first-order condition to the plaintiff’s problem then yields the differ-
ential equation
(xP (x)− x))x′P (x) =
1
2κ
, x ≥ x0P . (4)
We solve this equation using the non-decreasing solution and given the ini-
tial condition xP (x
0
P ) = x
0
P ; the latter characterizes the least-cost signalling
strategy, the so-called Riley equilibrium. The defendant’s strategy solves
(x− xD(x)))x′D(x) =
1
2κ
, x ≤ x0D, (5)
with xD(x
0
D) = x
0
D.
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The thresholds at which the parties decide to testify are a property of
the equilibrium. In the proof of the next Proposition (see the Appendix), we
14See Mailath (1987) for signalling games with a continuum of types.
15The solutions satisfy the conditions for a global maximum to the parties’ optimization
problem. See Mailath (1987).
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show that x0D = µ− γ and x0P = µ + γ. Thus, the parties’ decision whether
or not to testify is the same as in the pure disclosure framework. Solving the
differential equations then yields:
(i) The plaintiff’s testimony xP (x) is xP ≥ x satisfying
x = xP − 1− e
−2κ(xP−µ−γ)
2κ
, x ≥ µ+ γ. (6)
(ii) The defendant’s testimony xD(x) is xD ≤ x satisfying
x = xD +
1− e−2κ(µ−γ−xD)
2κ
, x ≤ µ− γ. (7)
To sum up:
Proposition 3: Under the adversarial procedure with least-cost separating
strategies, the defendant claims xD solving (7) when x ≤ µ − γ, while the
plaintiff is silent. When x ∈ (µ − γ, µ + γ), neither party testifies. When
x ≥ µ+ γ, the plaintiff claims xP solving (6) and the defendant is silent. If
one party testifies, the arbiter infers and adjudicates the true x; if neither
party testifies, the arbiter rationally expects and adjudicates µ.
x
( )Px x
 
( )Dx x
ix
D
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Figure 3: The least cost signalling strategies ( ) and x ( )P Dx x x
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The strategies are represented in Figure 3. At the threshold where he
decides to testify, the plaintiff claims the truth. For x > µ+γ, he inflates his
claim, i.e., xP (x) > x with limx→∞ xP (x) = x + 1/(2κ). Boasting increases
with the true state, yet at a decreasing rate. The defendant’s strategy is
similar. For x < µ− γ, xD(x) < x with limx→−∞ xP (x) = x− 1/(2κ).
3.2 Inquisitorial procedure
When the arbiter requires the plaintiff to testify, the separating strategy
xP (x) will also solve the differential equation (4) but without the boundary
condition; that is, the equation must hold for all x ∈ R.16 Similarly, when
the defendant is required to testify, xD(x) will solve the differential equation
(5) over the whole real line.
The least-cost separating strategies, i.e., the ones with the least inflated
claims are given by xP (x) = x+1/(2κ) and xD(x) = x−1/(2κ). The amount
of boasting is the same as asymptotically under the adversarial procedure.
Under the inquisitorial procedure there is no finite starting point upon which
the party can build in order to make his claims. For instance, under the
adversarial procedure the plaintiff knows that, if he testifies, the arbiter will
expect the true x to be at least µ + γ; in particular, the plaintiff will be
believed to speak the truth if he claims xP = µ+ γ. This opportunity is not
available under the inquisitorial procedure: if the plaintiff wants to convince
the arbiter that x = µ+ γ, he has to boost.
However, the inquisitorial arbiter has an additional option: he may re-
quire joint testimony. The idea is that, by forcing confrontation, both the
plaintiff and the defendant will be induced to falsify less because boosting
their claim is less productive. Under simultaneous testimony, the parties’
equilibrium strategies xD(x) and xP (x) are again one-to-one functions span-
ning the whole space. Hence, they can be inverted. When the arbiter observes
the pair (xD, xP ), he knows that the true x is equal to x
−1
D (xD) = x
−1
P (xP )
16This section borrows heavily from Emons and Fluet (2009). There we provide a more
detailed justification of the statements that follow.
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when the equality holds. When it does not hold, it must be that at least one
party deviated from his equilibrium strategy. By the minimality condition,
he then believes that at most one did. In the least-cost separating profile,
given the symmetry of lying costs, he assigns an equal chance to a deviation
by the plaintiff or the defendant. He therefore adjudicates
xˆ(xD, xP ) =
1
2
x−1D (xD) +
1
2
x−1P (xP ).
The plaintiff then chooses xP to maximize
1
2
x−1D (xD) +
1
2
x−1P (xP )− cP (xP , x).
The first-order conditions to this problem yields the differential equation
(xP (x)− x))x′P (x) =
1
4κ
.
Similarly, the defendant’s optimization problem yields
(x− xD(x)))x′D(x) =
1
4κ
.
These differential equations should be compared with the corresponding ones
under single testimony. The solutions, choosing the ones with the smallest
falsification, are xP (x) = x+ 1/(4κ) and xD(x) = x− 1/(4κ).
Under joint testimony, a party inflates his claim only half as much as he
would if he were the only one to testify. The reason is that the arbiter now
attaches to his testimony only half as much importance as he would under
single testimony. A party falsifies less because lying is costly and it now has
less influence on the arbiter’s decision.
3.3 The cost of testimony
We now collect some results that will be useful in our welfare comparison.
Consider first the inquisitorial procedure. Under single testimony, the lying
cost of the testifying party is k := κ (1/2κ)2 = 1/4κ. The total cost of
testimony is then γ + k. The easier it is to falsify, the larger the value
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of k. Under joint testimony, each party bears the cost γ + κ (1/4κ)2 =
γ+k/4. Summing over both parties yields the total cost of testimony 2γ+k/2.
Joint testimony is cheaper than single testimony when 2γ + k/2 < γ + k or
equivalently γ < k/2. Thus, for any fixed cost, joint testimony will be cheaper
than single testimony if falsification is sufficiently easy.
Consider next the adversarial procedure. Because we will be looking at
the family of equilibria generated by different values of γ, we write the parties’
strategies explicitly as a function of that parameter. For the plaintiff, the
falsification cost at equilibrium is vP (x, γ) := κ (xP (x, γ)− x)2 , x ≥ µ + γ.
From the previous discussion, we know that the function is increasing and
concave in x with vP (µ + γ, γ) = 0 and vP (∞, γ) = k. For the defendant
vD(x, γ) := κ (x− xD(x, γ))2 , x ≤ µ − γ, where vD(µ − γ, γ) = 0 and
vD(−∞, γ) = k. In the Appendix Lemma 2 summarizes some properties of
the falsification expenditure functions.
Testimonies depend on γ only through the initial condition, i.e., the curves
xD(x, ·) and xP (x, ·) simply shift horizontally when the fixed cost changes.
When the parties are more reluctant to testify they also falsify less, every-
thing else equal.
Over the range where a party testifies, the average falsification expendi-
ture is
v(γ) :=
∫ µ−γ
−∞
vD(x, γ)
f(x)
F (µ− γ) dx =
∫ ∞
µ+γ
vP (x, γ)
f(x)
1− F (µ+ γ) dx.
The equality follows from symmetry. The expected falsification expenditure
under the adversarial procedure is then [F (µ−γ)+1−F (µ+γ)]v(γ). It follows
immediately from Lemma 2 that the expected falsification expenditure is
decreasing in γ. Adding γ gives us the expected cost of testimony.
Finally, let us reconsider the plaintiff’s incentive to file suit. Under the
adversarial procedure, his expected payoff is µ − (1 − F (µ + γ))(γ + v(γ)).
Under the inquisitorial procedure, it is at worst µ − γ − k. Under either
procedure, a sufficient condition to sue is, therefore, µ > γ + k.
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3.4 Comparing the adversarial with the inquisitorial
procedure
It is useful to take pure disclosure as a benchmark. Let the fixed cost of
testimony under claim falsification be equal to the submission cost under
pure disclosure. Several results then follow immediately.
Consider the adversarial procedure. Even though the parties now attempt
to boost their claims, their decisions whether or not to testify are the same
as under pure disclosure: parties testify when x /∈ (µ − γ, µ + γ). Because
the arbiter infers the truth from the parties’ testimony, the social loss from
inaccurate adjudication is equal to the loss under pure disclosure. However,
testimony is more costly.
When parties may falsify, testimony under the inquisitorial procedure is
also more costly than in the pure disclosure framework. Because the ar-
biter trades-off the cost of testimony against error costs, he will be more
reluctant to allow testimony than under pure disclosure. Denote by γ(θ) the
frontier between testimony and no-testimony in the (θ, γ)-space, i.e., testi-
mony is allowed only when γ ≤ γ(θ). With pure disclosure, γ(θ) = θσ2.
When claims are inflated, the cost of testimony is either γ + k (single tes-
timony) or 2γ + k/2 (joint testimony), whichever is cheaper. Then γ(θ) =
max [θσ2 − k, θσ2/2− k/4, 0]; see Figures 4 and 5. Under the inquisitorial
procedure, adjudication will therefore more often be inaccurate when parties
may falsify than when they may not.
Finally, the cost of testimony will differ between procedures when parties
may boost. When single testimony is optimal under the inquisitorial pro-
cedure, the cost of testimony is larger than with the adversarial procedure.
When joint testimony is best, it is not clear at first sight which procedure is
cheaper.
The social loss under the inquisitorial procedure is
LI(θ, γ) = min
[
θσ2, γ + k, 2γ + k/2
]
. (8)
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Under the adversarial procedure, it is
LA(θ, γ) = θ
∫ µ+γ
µ−γ
(x−µ)2f(x) dx+[F (µ−γ)+1−F (µ+γ)](γ+v(γ)). (9)
Taking γ as given, (8) and (9) describe functions of θ similar to the ones
depicted in Figure 1. Indeed, when single testimony is optimal under the
inquisitorial procedure, LI(θ, γ) = min [θσ2, γ + k]. Then the LI and LA lines
will be as drawn in Figure 1. Specifically, because v(γ) < k, an argument
similar to the one used in Proposition 1 shows that the lines necessarily
intersect. Thus, the inquisitorial procedure will do better for either small or
large values of θ, while the adversarial procedure will do better for values in
between. The same argument cannot be used, however, when joint testimony
is best, i.e., when LI(θ, γ) = min [θσ2, 2γ + k/2]. As we will show below, it
is then possible that the LI and LA lines do not intersect. When this occurs,
the inquisitorial procedure does better for all values of θ.
In Figures 4 and 5, the lines γ = 1/θ and γ = γ(θ) are used to partition
the (θ, γ)-space into four regions, as was done in section 2. In Figure 4, the
lines intersect on the no testimony-joint testimony frontier of the inquisitorial
procedure. In Figure 5, they intersect on the no testimony-single testimony
frontier. In the latter case, region 3 defined by γ ≤ min[1/θ, γ(θ)] has been
further partitioned into two parts: the subregion 3a is for the case where
γ ≥ k/2 so that single testimony is required under the inquisitorial procedure;
the subregion 3b is for the case where γ < k/2 and joint testimony is required.
In the next result, regions 2 and 3 are taken to be closed sets, i.e., they include
their frontier.
Lemma 3: LA < LI in regions 1 and 3a. If v(0) ≤ k/2, LA < LI in the
whole of region 3.
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The argument for region 1 is similar to the one used under pure disclo-
sure, except that falsification costs must now be taken into account; in the
Appendix we show that when parties testify under the adversarial procedure,
the social value of information always exceeds the cost of testimony. The ar-
gument for region 3a (when it is non-empty) is also similar to the one used
for region 3 under pure disclosure: the adversarial procedure does better
because unwarranted testimony arises less often than under the inquisitorial
procedure, to which must now be added the fact that the cost of testimony
in region 3a is smaller under the adversarial than under the inquisitorial pro-
cedure. In the rest of region 3, that condition cannot be guaranteed. It does
hold, however, when v(0) ≤ k/2.
The foregoing condition plays an important role in what follows. Under
the adversarial procedure the expected falsification expenditure is
[F (µ− γ) + 1− F (µ+ γ)]v(γ)
which is decreasing in γ. In the limiting case where γ tends to zero, the
parties always testify under the adversarial procedure and the expression
reduces to v(0). v(0) is thus the upper bound of the expected falsification
expenditure under adversarial testimony. When v(0) ≤ k/2, the expected
falsification expenditure under the adversarial procedure is therefore always
smaller than under the inquisitorial one, for any value of γ. The same holds
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for the expected total cost of testimony including the fixed cost. When the
inequality is reversed, however, there will be a range of γ-values where the
inquisitorial procedure is cheaper because it yields smaller falsification costs.
From the preceding section we know that over the range where a party
testifies, a party’s falsification cost under the adversarial procedure varies
between zero and k. When prior beliefs are very precise (i.e., when σ2 is
very small), most of the probability weight will be concentrated close to the
mean of the distribution. Because vD(µ, 0) = vP (µ, 0) = 0, we will then
have v(0) < k/2. Conversely, when prior beliefs are very diffuse, most of the
probability weight will be on values of x far from the mean and we will then
have v(0) > k/2.
Let us now turn to our last result that shows in (θ, γ)-space which pro-
cedure is optimal.
Proposition 4:
i) If v(0) ≤ k/2, then for all γ > 0 there exists θ(γ) > θ(γ) > 0 such
that LA < LI if θ ∈ (θ(γ), θ(γ)) and LI ≤ LA otherwise.
ii) If v(0) > k/2, then there exists γˆ > 0 such that LI ≤ LA for all θ if
γ ≤ γˆ; if γ > γˆ there exists θ(γ) and θ(γ) as in i).
The first part of the Proposition is illustrated in Figure 6. The result
is similar to the one obtained under pure disclosure. However, the area
I2 is smaller whereas I4 is larger than the corresponding areas under pure
disclosure.
In region 2 the inquisitorial arbiter requires testimony. This region is
smaller than under pure disclosure; the inquisitorial arbiter is more reluc-
tant to require testimony because testimony is now more costly because of
falsification costs. This is captured by the lower upper bound γ(θ) for re-
gion 2 compared to pure disclosure. In addition, when v(0) ≤ k/2, the cost
of testimony under the adversarial procedure is smaller than under the in-
quisitorial procedure. Hence, the area within region 2 where the inquisitorial
does better is smaller: for a given θ, the inquisitorial procedure will do better
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only within a smaller range of γ-values.17 In region 4 the inquisitorial arbiter
refuses to hear any testimony at all, yielding the social loss LI = θσ2. The
area I4 is larger than under pure disclosure because the cost of adversarial
testimony is now larger. For a given θ, the inquisitorial procedure will now
do better within a larger range of γ-values.
22
k
2
)0(

v



1

)( 

2I
4I
)(
)(
Figure 6: Small prior uncertainty
The second part of Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 7. This differs
markedly from the pure disclosure set-up. The inquisitorial procedure does
better in the shaded area. To see how this area is obtained, suppose that the
inquisitorial arbiter does not have the option of requiring joint testimony, so
that LI(θ, γ) = min [θσ2, γ + k] irrespective of the values of γ and k. Then
the inquisitorial procedure does better in the shaded area below the two
dashed curves, i.e., either for small for or large values of θ as in part i) of
Proposition 4.
17One can show that I2 is bounded below by the curve γ = g(θ) := (1 +
√
1 + θ/k)/2θ.
This curve is above the γ = 1/θ curve but tends to it asymptotically when θ becomes
arbitrarily large.
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When the option of joint testimony becomes available, the rest of the
shaded area must be added: confronting the parties is cheaper than single
testimony for γ < k/2. Therefore, for all γ ≤ γˆ, the inquisitorial procedure
does better than the adversarial one for all values of θ; here γˆ is the value of
γ at which the shaded area crosses the joint testimony-no testimony frontier.
In the Appendix we show that the relevant areas are as depicted.
To sum up: If lying costs are not too important compared to the fixed
cost of testifying (i.e., γ ≥ k/2) or if there is little prior uncertainty (i.e., σ2
is small so that v(0) ≤ k/2), the inquisitorial procedure is better than the
adversarial one when accuracy in adjudication is not too important or, con-
versely, when it is very important; otherwise, the adversarial procedure does
better. When lying costs are important and there is significant prior uncer-
tainty (k/2 is sufficiently large and v(0) > k/2), the inquisitorial procedure
does better irrespective of the importance of accuracy in adjudication.
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4 Concluding Remarks
We have derived the equilibrium testifying behavior under adversarial ar-
bitration. When the true value of the amount at issue differs only slightly
from the prior mean, the parties remain silent and do not spend resources
on falsification. This comes at the expense of incorrect decisions, but the
social loss from inaccurate adjudication will then also be small. Only when
the true value differs sufficiently from the prior mean do parties testify. This
enables correct decisions, yet at the expense of falsification costs.
Moreover, we have compared the adversarial with the inquisitorial pro-
cedure, taking into account submission costs and accuracy in adjudication.
When wasteful influence expenditures are not too large, the inquisitorial pro-
cedure performs better when the arbiter has strong views about error costs;
otherwise, the adversarial procedure does better. However, when falsifica-
tion expenditures are an important component of the cost of testimony, the
inquisitorial procedure does better irrespective of the weight attached to ac-
curacy in adjudication.
We have assumed extreme forms both for the adversarial and inquisitorial
procedures. Under the former, our arbiter is passive and can just wait for
testimony by the parties. Under the latter, the arbiter does not have the
option to let the parties freely decide whether they want to testify: he can
only either summon them to testify or refuse to hear them. Obviously, an
active arbiter who also has the option to let the parties freely testify would
yield the best of both worlds. On matters where accuracy has negligible social
value, he would refuse to hear the parties. When accuracy has very large
social value, he could summon one or both parties to testify. In intermediate
cases, he could let the parties decide whether or not they want to testify.
He then relies on the parties’ superior private information about the true
state to reach the best compromise between submission costs and accuracy.
This is not unlike the justification often given for “managerial judges” who
participate in activities such as pretrial discovery and settlement bargaining
(see Schrag, 1999).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. We complete the argument in the text by showing that
LA(γ/σ2, γ) < LI(γ/σ2, γ), i.e.,
(γ/σ2)
∫ µ+γ
µ−γ
(x− µ)2f(x) dx+ γ[F (µ− γ) + 1− F (µ+ γ)] < γ
or equivalently∫ µ+γ
µ−γ
(x− µ)2
(
f(x)
F (µ+ γ)− F (µ− γ)
)
dx <
∫ ∞
−∞
(x− µ)2f(x) dx.
Given symmetry, the distribution f(x) is a mean-preserving spread of the con-
ditional distribution f(x)/ (F (µ+ γ)− F (µ− γ)). The inequality then follows
from the strict convexity of (x− µ)2 with respect to x. 
Proof of Corollary 1. If θ ≤ θ(γ), it follows directly from Lemma 1 and Fig-
ure 1 that γ > LA(θ, γ) ≥ LI(θ, γ) = θσ2. Similarly, if θ ≥θ(γ), it follows that
θσ2> LA(θ, γ) ≥ LI(θ, γ) = γ. Using symmetry, the inequality LA(θ, γ) ≥ θσ2
is easily seen to be equivalent to∫ ∞
µ+γ
[γ − θ(x− µ)2]f(x) dx ≥ 0. (10)
The inequality LA(θ, γ) ≥ γ is equivalent to∫ µ+γ
µ
[γ − θ(x− µ)2]f(x) dx ≤ 0. (11)
Now, observe that∫ ∞
µ+γ
[γ − θ(x− µ)2]f(x) dx <
∫ ∞
µ+γ
γ(1− γθ)f(x) dx (12)
and ∫ µ+γ
µ
[γ − θ(x− µ)2]f(x) dx >
∫ µ+γ
µ
γ(1− γθ)f(x) dx. (13)
If γθ ≥ 1, (12) implies that (10) cannot hold. Thus, θ ≤ θ(γ) implies γ < 1/θ
as well as γ > θσ2. If γθ ≤ 1, (13) implies that (11) cannot hold. Thus, θ ≥θ(γ)
implies γ > 1/θ as well as γ < θσ2. 
Properties of the functions θ(γ) and θ(γ). θ(γ) is the unique solution to LA(θ, γ) =
θσ2. Because LA(θ, 0) = 0, θ(0) = 0. Moreover, for any γ > 0, there exists θ
sufficiently small such that (γ, θ) is in I4. Hence, the curve θ(γ) is tangent to the
curve γ = θσ2 at γ = θ = 0. Indeed,
θ′(γ) =
LAγ (γ, θ)
σ2−2 ∫ µ+γ
µ
(x− µ)2f(x) dx
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where
LAγ (γ, θ) = 2 [1− F (µ+ γ)]− 2γ(1− θγ)f(µ+ γ).
Hence, θ′(0) = 1/σ2. It is easily verified that θ′′(0) < 0. Similarly, for γ large,
the curve cannot intersect the vertical axis. Hence, it must extend upwards as
shown.
θ(γ) is the unique solution to LA(γ, θ) = γ. For any γ > 0, there exists θ suffi-
ciently large such that (γ, θ) is in I2. Therefore, the curve must extend indefinitely
downwards bounded only by γ = 1/θ, and indefinitely upwards bounded only by
γ = θσ2. Indeed
θ
′
(γ) =
1− LAγ (γ, θ)
2
∫ µ+γ
µ
(x− µ)2f(x) dx,
When γ and θ tend to infinity, θ
′
(γ) tends to 1/σ2.
Proof that pooling with no testimony is no equilibrium under the Grossman-Perry
refinement.
Take some xP> µ+ γ. Suppose P expects a judgement xˆ ≥ γ. Then P
makes no loss when the true x satisfies xˆ− γ − κ(xP−x)2≥ µ and benefits if the
inequality is strict. Let x and x be the solutions for the equality in this condi-
tion and write x= xP−h(xˆ), x= xP+h(xˆ), where h(xˆ) is strictly decreasing with
h(µ+ γ) = 0. Now define φ(xˆ) = E(x|xP−h(xˆ) ≤ x ≤ xP+h(xˆ)). Note that
φ(µ+ γ) = xP> µ+ γ. For xP sufficiently large, xP−h(xˆ) > µ so that f(x)
is decreasing over the interval. Because xP is the midpoint, it then follows that
φ(xˆ) < xP . In particular φ(xP ) < xP . By continuity there exist xˆ
∗∈ (µ+ γ, xP )
such that φ(xˆ∗) = xˆ∗. Thus, when x ∈ (xP−h(xˆ∗), xP+h(xˆ∗), P would do strictly
better by reporting xP expecting xˆ∗ and the judge would be right to infer the pos-
terior mean xˆ∗. 
Proof of Lemma 1.
(i) Suppose first that both parties always testify. Let (x′P , x
′
D) be the equilib-
rium pair at x′. Because x′ is revealed, it follows from monotonicity that either
xP (x) or xD(x) is strictly increasing at x′. Let this be true of xP (x). If D
deviates to ∅D, by minimality the arbiter then infers x′ from the observation of
(x′P , ∅D). Therefore, D is better off because he saves on the cost of testimony
without affecting the arbiter’s decision.
Next, suppose P always testifies but D does so only at x ≤ x0D. If xD(x) is
strictly increasing at some x′< x0D, the preceding argument shows that P would
be better off deviating to ∅P . So it must be that xD(x) is constant for all x ≤ x0D,
the true state being revealed only through xP (x). If P deviates to ∅P at some
x ≤ x0D, by minimality the arbiter will adjudicate some ν ≤ x0D. But then P
saves on the cost of testimony and is better off deviating whenever x < ν. Finally,
suppose P always testifies but D never does. The argument is then similar: if P
deviates to ∅P at some x, the arbiter will adjudicate some ν and P will be better
off if x is sufficiently small.
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We conclude that D testifies for x ≤ x0D and is otherwise silent, P testifies for
x ≥ x0P and is otherwise silent, where x0D and x0P are finite.
(ii) It remains to show that x0D< x
0
P . Suppose on the contrary that there
is some range [x0P , x
0
D] where both parties testify. We show that this yields a
contradiction.
a) We first show that xD(x) is strictly increasing in a left-neighborhood of x0D
and that xD(x
0
D) = x
0
D; hence xD(x) = xD(x
0
D) has the unique solution x = x
0
D.
Suppose that xD(x
0
D) < x
0
D. Then, the action x
0
D is cheaper for D than the equi-
librium play of xD(x
0
D). By monotonicity, x
0
D is then never played at equilibrium.
By minimality, when he observes the out-of-equilibrium pair (xP (x
0
D), x
0
D), the
arbiter therefore discards x0D and infers x from the observation of xP (x
0
D) alone.
Because strategies are monotone, he must infer some xˆ ≤ x0D. Consequently, D
would deviate from the postulated strategy. Therefore, xD(x
0
D) = x
0
D. Suppose
next that xD(x) is not strictly increasing in the left-neighborhood. By mono-
tonicity, it must then be constant, i.e., xD(x) = x
0
D. But for x < x
0
D this yields
xD(x) > x, contradicting the no-understatement condition.
b) We next show that cP (xP (x
0
D+ε), x
0
D) ≥ cP (xP (x0D), x0D) for ε > 0. Be-
cause the equilibrium is revealing, and given monotonicity, xP (x
0
D+ε) ≥ xP (x0D)
and xP (x
0
D+ε) is strictly increasing in ε. By minimality, when he observes the out-
of-equilibrium pair (xP (x
0
D+ε), xD(x
0
D)), the arbiter infers some xˆ ∈ [x0D, x0D+ε].
That is, if he thinks that P has deviated, he must conclude that x = x0D; if he
thinks that D has deviated, he must conclude that x = x0D+ε; and he may assign
positive probabilities to both possibilities. When he observes the equilibrium pair
(xP (x
0
D), xD(x
0
D)), the arbiter correctly infers x = x
0
D≤ xˆ. For P not to deviate
from xP (x
0
D) to xP (x
0
D+ε), it must therefore be that
cP (xP (x
0
D+ε), x
0
D)− cP (xP (x0D), x0D) ≥ 0, all ε > 0. (14)
c) Finally, we show that (14) cannot in fact hold for ε sufficiently small. Denote
by x˜ the arbiter’s belief upon observing the out-of-equilibrium pair (xP (x
0
D), ∅D).
At x = x0D, and recalling that xD(x
0
D) = x
0
D, D’s equilibrium payoff is −x0D−γ.
For D not to deviate to ∅D, it must be that
−x0D−γ ≥ −x˜. (15)
At x0D+ε, the equilibrium pair is (xP (x
0
D+ε), ∅D). For P not to deviate to
xP (x
0
D), it must be that
x0D+ε− cP (xP (x0D+ε), x0D+ε) ≥x˜−cP (xP (x0D), x0D+ε). (16)
Combining (15) and (16) yields
cP (xP (x
0
D+ε), x
0
D+ε)− cP (xP (x0D), x0D+ε) ≤ ε− γ. (17)
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For ε positive but arbitrarily small, (14) and (17) cannot simultaneously hold given
γ > 0 and the continuity of the cost functions. 
Proof of Proposition 3. We briefly complete the argument in the text. Rather than
attempting to solve (4) and (5) directly, it is easier to work with the equations
expressed in terms of the inverse of xP (x) and xD(x), which we write x(xP ) and
x(xD) respectively. The differential equations then become:
2κ(xP−x(xP )) = x′(xP ), (18)
2κ(x(xD)− xD) = x′(xD). (19)
The general solution to (18), given the condition x(xP ) ≤ xP , is
x = xP−1−Ke
−2κxP
2κ
for some constant K. Choosing the constant to satisfy the initial condition
x(x0P ) = x
0
P yields
x = xP−1−Ke
−2κ(xP−x0P )
2κ
.
Similarly,
x = xD+
1−Ke−2κ(x0D−xP )
2κ
.
It remains to determine the constants x0P and x
0
D. The argument is the same
as in Proposition 1. When neither party submits, the arbiter’s posterior mean is
ϕ∅ := E (x | ∅P , ∅D) = E
(
x | x0D < x < x0P
)
. (20)
At x = x0P party P is just indifferent between submitting and not submitting. If
the party submits, the true state is revealed at the cost of γ. If the party does not
submit, the arbiter adjudicates ϕ∅. Thus party P is indifferent if x0P − γ = ϕ∅.
Using the same argument, when x = x0D, party D is indifferent between submitting
and not if −x0D − γ = −ϕ∅. Combining with (20) yields
ϕ∅ = E (x | ϕ∅ − γ < x < ϕ∅ + γ) .
Thus, the updated expectation given that x is in the interval [ϕ∅− γ, ϕ∅+ γ] must
be the mid point ϕ∅. Given the normal density, this is possible only if ϕ∅ equals
the prior mean µ. Consequently, x0P = µ+ γ, x
0
D = µ− γ.
Finally, we specify the arbiter’s beliefs for out-of-equilibrium moves. We discuss
only the beliefs that prevent a unilateral deviation by P ; deviations by D would
be dealt with in the same way. There are two relevant situations:
(i) The true state is x > µ− γ; the equilibrium pair is (∅P , ∅D) if x < µ+ γ,
it is (xP (x), ∅D) with xP (x) ≥ µ+ γ if x ≥ µ+ γ. Suppose the arbiter observes
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(xP , ∅D) with xP< µ+ γ. By minimality, he believes that P has deviated while
D played his equilibrium strategies. Hence he puts unit probability on the event
x > µ− γ. One possibility is that he infers x = µ, in which case the deviation by
P is clearly unprofitable.
(ii) The true state is x ≤ µ− γ so that the equilibrium pair is (∅P , xD(x)),
where xD(x) ≤ µ− γ. Suppose the arbiter observes (xP , xD(x)) with xP< µ+ γ.
By minimality, he believes that P has deviated while D played at equilibrium.
Hence he disregards xP and infers the state from the play of xD alone, which clearly
makes the deviation unprofitable. Next, suppose the arbiter observes (xP , xD(x))
with xP≥ µ+ γ. Then the arbiter does not know who has deviated. By minimal-
ity, he believes that at most one did. One possibility is that he assigns an equal
chance to either possibility and therefore adjudicates x−1D (xD)/2 + x
−1
P (xP )/2. P
then earns the payoff
pi :=1
2
x+1
2
x−1P (xP )− γ − κ(xP−x)2,
which must be compared with his equilibrium payoff of x. Because xP (·) satisfies
(4),
∂pi
∂xP
=
1
2
∂x−1P (xP )
∂xP
−2κ(xP−x) = −κ(xP−x) < 0.
Hence, we need only check whether a deviation to xP= µ+ γ might be profitable.
The payoff is then
pi =1
2
x+1
2
(µ+ γ)− γ − κ(µ+ γ − x)2.
This is increasing in x. At x = µ− γ, µ− γ − κ(2γ)2< µ− γ = x. 
Lemma 2: vPx (x, γ) ∈ (0, 1] with vPx (µ + γ, γ) = 1; vDx (x, γ) ∈ [−1, 0) with
vDx (µ − γ, γ) = −1; vixx(x, γ) < 0, viγ ∈ [−1, 0), i = D,P , with vDγ (µ − γ, γ) =
vPγ (µ+ γ, γ) = −1.
Proof. Define
ϕ(x− µ− γ) := xP (x, γ)− x, x ≥ µ+ γ, γ ≥ 0.
where ϕ(·) is the “claim inflation function” defined over R+ and which is invariant
across equilibria. From (4) and given the initial condition, ϕ(0) = 0 and
ϕ(y)
(
1 + ϕ′(y)
)
=
1
2κ
, y ≥ 0. (21)
Also ϕ(y) < 1/(2κ) and ϕ′′(y) < 0 with ϕ′(0) =∞ and ϕ′(∞) = 0. The plaintiff’s
falsification expenditure is
vP (x, γ) ≡ κϕ(x− µ− γ)2, x ≥ µ+ γ.
For x > µ+ γ and using (21),
vPx (x, γ) = 2κϕ(x− µ− γ)ϕ′(x− µ− γ) = 1− 2κϕ(x− µ− γ)
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vPγ (x, γ) = − (1− 2κϕ(x− µ− γ)) .
Therefore vPxx < 0, v
P
x (x, γ) ∈ (0, 1] and vPγ (x, γ) ∈ (−1, 0). At x = µ + γ, the
preceding partial derivative is not defined. We use
vPγ (µ+ γ, γ) := lim
x↓µ+γ
vPγ (x, γ) = −1.
For D, x−xD(x, γ) = ϕ(µ− γ−x), x ≤ µ− γ, and the argument is the same. 
Proof of Lemma 3.
(i) In Region 1, θγ ≥ 1 and LI(θ, γ) = θσ2. Using symmetry,
∆(θ, γ) := LI(θ, γ)− LA(θ, γ) = 2
∫ ∞
µ+γ
ψ(x)f(x) dx,
where
ψ(x) := θ (x− µ)2 − (γ + vP (x, γ)) , x ≥ µ+ γ.
It suffices to show that ψ(x) is always positive. Applying Corollary 2, ψ′′(x) > 0.
Moreover, vP (µ+ γ, γ) = 0 and vPx (µ+ γ, γ) = 1. Hence
ψ(µ+ γ) = γ(θγ − 1) ≥ 0,
ψ′(µ+ γ) = 2θγ − vPx (µ+ γ, γ) ≥ 1.
Therefore ψ(x) > 0 for all x > µ+ γ.
(ii) In Region 3a, if it exists, θγ ≤ 1 and LI(θ, γ) = γ + k. Then
∆(θ, γ)
2
=
∫ µ+γ
µ
[
γ + k − θ (x− µ)2
]
f(x) dx+
∫ ∞
µ+γ
(
k − vP (x, γ)) f(x) dx
>
∫ µ+γ
µ
[k + γ(1− θγ)] f(x) dx+
∫ ∞
µ+γ
(
k − vP (x, γ)) f(x) dx > 0.
(iii) Consider now the area defined by γ ≤ k/2 and γ ≤ min [γ(θ), 1/θ]. When
γ(θ) and γ = 1/θ intersect at some γ ≤ k/2, this area is the whole of region 3;
when the intersection occurs at some γ > k/2, the area is region 3b. In either
case, LI(θ, γ) = 2γ + k/2. Hence
∆(θ, γ)
2
= γ +
k
4
−
∫ µ+γ
µ
θ (x− µ)2 f(x) dx−
∫ ∞
µ+γ
(
γ + vP (x, γ)
)
f(x) dx.
When v(0) ≤ k/2,
∆(θ, 0) =
k
2
− v(0) ≥ 0.
Differentiating with respect to γ,
∆γ(θ, γ)
2
= 1 + γ(1− θγ)f(µ+ γ) +
∫ ∞
µ+γ
(
1 + vPγ (x, γ)
)
f(x) dx > 0.
35
By Corollary 2, the integrand of the second term is positive. Therefore ∆(θ, γ) > 0
in this area as well. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Let ∆(θ, γ) = LI(θ, γ)− LA(θ, γ). From the argument in
the text, we know that: for any γ > 0, if ∆(θ, γ) > 0 for some θ′, there exists
θ(γ) > θ(γ) > 0 such that ∆(θ, γ) > 0 if θ ∈ (θ(γ), θ(γ)) and LI ≤ LA otherwise.
i) By Lemma 2, when v(0) ≤ k/2, ∆(θ, γ) > 0 in the regions 1 and 3. For
any γ, one can choose θ so that (θ, γ) is in region 1 or in region 3. Hence the
condition ∆ > 0 can always be satisfied for some θ, which proves the first part of
the Proposition.
ii) Suppose now v(0) > k/2. For any γ ≥ k/2, one can always choose θ such
that (θ, γ) is in region 1 (as in Figure 4) or is in either region 1 or region 3a (as in
Figure 5). The same argument as in i) can then be applied. We therefore restrict
attention to γ < k/2. We then have LI(θ, γ) = min(θσ2, 2γ + k/2). Moreover
∆(θ, 0) = min(θσ2, k/2)− v(0) < 0.
By continuity, therefore, ∆(θ, γ) ≤ 0 for all θ if γ is not too large. We now
characterize the area where the preceding inequality holds.
When 2γ+k/2 ≤ θσ2 (i.e., when joint testimony is preferred to no testimony),
∆(θ, γ) ≤ 0 implies ∆(θ′, γ) < 0 for all θ′ > θ. When 2γ + k/2 ≥ θσ2 (i.e., when
no testimony is preferred), ∆(θ, γ) ≤ 0 implies ∆(θ′, γ) < 0 for all θ′ < θ. In
particular, for points on the boundary between joint testimony and no testimony,
∆(θ, γ) ≤ 0 implies ∆(θ′, γ) < 0 for all θ′ 6= θ.
On the boundary, the difference between the social losses is ∆(θ, γ(θ)), where
γ(θ) = θσ2/2 − k/4. At the horizontal intercept, ∆ = k/2 − v(0) < 0. Let θ0
be the smallest value at which ∆(θ, γ(θ)) changes sign, from negative to positive.
Such a θ0 necessarily exists because ∆ > 0 when γ(θ) crosse the γ = 1/θ curve as
in Figure 4 or the γ = k/2 line as in Figure 5. The critical γˆ referred to in the
Proposition equals γ(θ0), i.e., ∆(θ, γ) ≤ 0 for all θ can be true only for γ ≤ γ(θ0).

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